Sahel Jihadist Rivalry Becomes a Regional War in 2026

The rivalry between al-Qaeda’s JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province has grown into a regional war that, according to Africanews, now reaches western Niger and northwestern Nigeria. For US readers, it threatens gold and uranium supply chains, counter-terrorism policy and the security of Gulf of Guinea states that host American investment.

The Sahel is the semi-arid belt south of the Sahara that stretches from Senegal to Sudan. This analysis explains who the two factions are, why they are fighting each other and where the violence could spread, drawing on Africanews, Le Temps and our own Africa Intelligence Brief .

Fighting between the two groups has intensified since September 2026 in the borderlands where Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger meet. On 1 September the factions clashed near N’Daki, close to the Mali, Burkina Faso border; sources differ on which side of the line it lay.

ISSP-linked channels claimed between 100 and more than 250 JNIM fighters killed, depending on the report. None of these tolls has been independently verified.

In October fighting broke out in Burkina Faso’s Oudalan province, near the Mali and Niger borders. On 12 October ISSP claimed it had killed more than 400 JNIM fighters, a claim not confirmed by independent sources.

ACLED analyst Heni Nsaibia said that, if confirmed, this would be the deadliest single battle recorded between the two groups. ACLED data he cited show more than 320 battles and about 2,200 deaths between 2019 and September 2026.

The escalation follows years of competition that began in 2019. In early April 2026 ISSP claimed 35 JNIM fighters killed in Niger’s Tillabéri region, reportedly the first documented clash between the two in Niger.

Africanews reports that the fighting has since spread into western Niger and northwestern Nigeria. This turns a contest once contained in the tri-border area into a wider regional security crisis.

JNIM remains the stronger group, with an estimated 7,000 to 8,000 fighters against about 2,000 for Islamic State, Africanews reports. That gap makes ISSP’s claims of mass kills hard to assess without independent confirmation.

JNIM is the Arabic acronym for Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims. It was formed in Mali in March 2017 from several al-Qaeda-aligned factions, including Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Sahara emirate, al-Mourabitoun and the Macina Liberation Front.

JNIM operates as a coalition rather than a single centralised army. Its strength is local embedment: alliances with communities, recruitment among aggrieved populations, shadow courts, taxation and control of rural transport corridors.

That does not make JNIM moderate, because it has attacked civilians, imposed coercive rules and disrupted commerce. But compared with ISSP, it has generally shown greater flexibility toward local leaders and non-jihadist armed groups.

ISSP is the Islamic State’s Sahel branch, formerly widely known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. Its Malian stronghold around Ménaka has been central to its expansion.

Its main operating zone runs from northeastern Mali through western Niger into parts of Burkina Faso. Africanews reports that its reach now extends into Niger’s Tahoua, Dosso and Maradi regions.

ISSP follows a more rigid transnational doctrine and treats rival armed groups, community leaders and alleged collaborators as enemies. Africanews notes that it does not shy away from targeting civilians who refuse to accept its authority.

The groups compete for the same rural populations, cattle corridors, smuggling routes, border crossings and taxation bases. Where governments have limited reach, control of a village or road can bring food, recruits, intelligence, revenue and influence over local chiefs and traders.

The tri-border zone is valuable because borders are porous while national security forces are stretched. Fighters can attack in one country and retreat into another.

JNIM’s al-Qaeda lineage accepts tactical alliances and gradual consolidation. ISSP regards such accommodation as ideological compromise, so each group treats the other as an illegitimate rival for leadership of jihad in West Africa.

The rivalry is not merely theological. Ideology shapes whom each faction recruits, taxes, negotiates with or punishes, so a local alliance that helps JNIM can become a target for ISSP.

Military coups and the exit of foreign forces have weakened the region’s security architecture. The insurgents are therefore contesting not only remote areas but also local state authority.

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and formed the Alliance of Sahel States, a confederation of the three juntas. Their governments present the move as sovereign self-reliance.

In operational terms, the shift has reduced intelligence-sharing and coordination with Western and regional partners while the insurgency remains unresolved. In July 2026 Mali’s government also publicly rejected reports of a US intervention against JNIM, Africanews reported.

Russia has become the juntas’ main security partner. In Mali, the Africa Corps, which reports to Russia’s Defence Ministry, replaced the Wagner Group and supports the army in combat.

Russia supplies military assistance, advisers and political backing, but it has not shown that it can replace Western intelligence, airlift, surveillance and training. The security record remains poor: South Africa’s BusinessDay quoted a security source saying 130 soldiers died in the 10 September attack on Dioura, and a diplomatic source saying about 120.

Western Niger is the most immediate expansion zone. ISSP claimed 35 JNIM fighters killed in Tillabéri in early April 2026, reportedly the first clash between the two inside Niger.

Tillabéri surrounds Niger’s capital, Niamey, and links the Mali and Burkina Faso conflict zones to the more populated southwest. ISSP has also been active in Dosso, which borders Benin and northwestern Nigeria.

A sustained rivalry in western Niger could bring attacks on bases and border posts, road disruption around Niamey and displacement toward safer areas. It could also add pressure on Niger’s isolated junta and open routes into northern Nigeria.

Northwestern Nigeria could serve as a rear area because of weak border coordination, insecurity and criminal economies. Africanews reports that ISSP’s reach now extends through Niger’s Tahoua, Dosso and Maradi regions toward Nigeria’s northwest.

The risk is not necessarily an immediate large-scale takeover. A more plausible path is the gradual establishment of cells, logistics networks, weapons channels and recruitment links.

Nigeria already faces Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province in the northeast. A second jihadist corridor in the northwest could stretch its security forces across multiple fronts.

The Gulf of Guinea states are the most important strategic frontier. ADF Magazine reports that JNIM has launched attacks into Benin from the W-Arly-Pendjari park complex, and Burkina Faso’s southern border creates routes toward Togo, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.

Threats to coastal states could arrive through cross-border raids, attacks on rural security posts, intimidation of local officials, recruitment in marginalised border communities, smuggling and kidnapping. Transport and energy infrastructure could also be targeted.

Benin and Togo face the greatest immediate exposure because their northern regions abut Burkina Faso. Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have stronger state capacity, but their northern corridors and border communities remain vulnerable.

Mali is a major gold producer and Niger mines uranium, so insecurity in the central Sahel matters for commodity supply chains. The IMF said fuel supply disruptions after terrorist attacks in the fourth quarter of 2025 dampened Mali’s economic activity that year.

The IMF approved the second and final review of Mali’s Staff-Monitored Program on 18 March 2026. It expects recovery in 2026 if fuel supply is restored, security improves, domestic arrears are repaid and the mining dispute is resolved.

The IMF’s Rapid Credit Facility disbursement of about US$129 million, equal to 50 percent of Mali’s quota, was approved on 16 April 2025. The staff report on the review was published on 6 July 2026.

In September 2026 JNIM said it had struck air defence systems at the airport in Sévaré, in Mali’s Mopti region, which houses military aircraft and drones. Such attacks threaten the transport and logistics that businesses depend on.

The US Department of State rates Mali Level 4: Do Not Travel, citing crime, terrorism, kidnapping, unrest and health risks. Its advisory is dated 9 January 2026.

Mali suspended visa issuance to US citizens at the end of December 2025, with limited exceptions, in response to Washington’s travel ban on Malian nationals. The State Department notes that extortion and kidnapping for ransom are significant sources of financing for terrorist and criminal groups.

For US counter-terrorism policy, the rivalry presents a dilemma. The factions may weaken each other in some areas, but their competition also drives expansion into new territory and more violence against civilians.