How I would counter-interdict a $1.5B energy takeover before 2027 (A masterclass in corporate warfare)

Across the trading desks of the Nigerian Exchange (NGX) and the London Stock Exchange (LSE), a dangerous consensus has taken hold. The consensus narrative treats Tony Elumelu’s scheduled assumption of the Seplat Energy Plc chairmanship on January 1, 2027, as an institutional fait accompli. Following Heirs Energies’ recent $70 million acquisition of an additional 1% stake, expanding their anchor position to 21.07% and valuing the stake at approximately $1.5 billion, the financial press declared the transition settled. To the retail investor or casual market observer, a $1.5 billion capital footprint looks like an unassailable fortress. But across the upper echelons of international corporate finance and cross-border investment banking, a 21% shareholding is not an impenetrable wall. It is an exposed flank. In dual-listed equity markets, executive succession and boardroom authority are dictated strictly by equity stake, board votes, regulatory approvals, and shareholder consensus. Taking over as chairman or controlling shareholder in a dual-listed energy titan is never a matter of sentiment; it is purely a function of capital deployment, proxy mechanics, and securing the majority vote of the shareholding base. If I were tasked with staging a counter-interdiction against an incumbent anchor investor, I would not engage in a public bidding war. I would deploy a high-conviction, four-phase corporate manoeuvre designed to bypass open markets, choke operational pipelines, and force an asymmetric boardroom takeover ahead of the January 2027 deadline. Creeping equity accumulation through public stock exchanges creates a false sense of security. When an anchor shareholder holds 21% of a public company, nearly 79% of the voting equity remains floating across global institutional registries, Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), and key block holders. I would never fight an anchor shareholder by chasing open-market price spikes on the exchange floor. Bidding up shares in the open market merely inflates the target’s valuation and burns acquiring capital unnecessarily. Instead, I bypass the exchange altogether. The institutional free float of 78.93% comprises local Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), strategic block holders such as the Petrolin Group, and foreign institutional funds in the UK and EU. Through a confidential SPV, off-market swaps and OTC block buys would bring these holdings together into a binding 26%, 31% voting block, giving the syndicate total veto power over special resolutions under CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules. I would assemble a confidential Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), backed by European private equity consortia, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and regional banking syndicates, to execute off-market, over-the-counter (OTC) derivative swaps and block purchases. By quietly targeting institutional free-float, local PFAs, and key block holders like the Petrolin Group, my syndicate would aggregate a binding 26% to 31% voting block. Under dual-listing rules (Nigeria’s CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules), holding a 25%+ stake grants total veto power over special resolutions. This single move empowers my syndicate to block capital alterations, debt restructurings, and strategic asset divestments, effectively neutering unilateral board control without ever triggering an open-market panic. While Phase I neutralises public equity markets, Phase II shifts to hard asset economics in the Niger Delta. Seplat’s multi-billion-dollar valuation depends on seamless midstream processing throughput and export evacuation routes. Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

To the retail investor or casual market observer, a $1.5 billion capital footprint looks like an unassailable fortress. But across the upper echelons of international corporate finance and cross-border investment banking, a 21% shareholding is not an impenetrable wall. It is an exposed flank. In dual-listed equity markets, executive succession and boardroom authority are dictated strictly by equity stake, board votes, regulatory approvals, and shareholder consensus. Taking over as chairman or controlling shareholder in a dual-listed energy titan is never a matter of sentiment; it is purely a function of capital deployment, proxy mechanics, and securing the majority vote of the shareholding base. If I were tasked with staging a counter-interdiction against an incumbent anchor investor, I would not engage in a public bidding war. I would deploy a high-conviction, four-phase corporate manoeuvre designed to bypass open markets, choke operational pipelines, and force an asymmetric boardroom takeover ahead of the January 2027 deadline. Creeping equity accumulation through public stock exchanges creates a false sense of security. When an anchor shareholder holds 21% of a public company, nearly 79% of the voting equity remains floating across global institutional registries, Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), and key block holders. I would never fight an anchor shareholder by chasing open-market price spikes on the exchange floor. Bidding up shares in the open market merely inflates the target’s valuation and burns acquiring capital unnecessarily. Instead, I bypass the exchange altogether. The institutional free float of 78.93% comprises local Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), strategic block holders such as the Petrolin Group, and foreign institutional funds in the UK and EU. Through a confidential SPV, off-market swaps and OTC block buys would bring these holdings together into a binding 26%, 31% voting block, giving the syndicate total veto power over special resolutions under CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules. I would assemble a confidential Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), backed by European private equity consortia, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and regional banking syndicates, to execute off-market, over-the-counter (OTC) derivative swaps and block purchases. By quietly targeting institutional free-float, local PFAs, and key block holders like the Petrolin Group, my syndicate would aggregate a binding 26% to 31% voting block. Under dual-listing rules (Nigeria’s CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules), holding a 25%+ stake grants total veto power over special resolutions. This single move empowers my syndicate to block capital alterations, debt restructurings, and strategic asset divestments, effectively neutering unilateral board control without ever triggering an open-market panic. While Phase I neutralises public equity markets, Phase II shifts to hard asset economics in the Niger Delta. Seplat’s multi-billion-dollar valuation depends on seamless midstream processing throughput and export evacuation routes. Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

It is an exposed flank. In dual-listed equity markets, executive succession and boardroom authority are dictated strictly by equity stake, board votes, regulatory approvals, and shareholder consensus. Taking over as chairman or controlling shareholder in a dual-listed energy titan is never a matter of sentiment; it is purely a function of capital deployment, proxy mechanics, and securing the majority vote of the shareholding base. If I were tasked with staging a counter-interdiction against an incumbent anchor investor, I would not engage in a public bidding war. I would deploy a high-conviction, four-phase corporate manoeuvre designed to bypass open markets, choke operational pipelines, and force an asymmetric boardroom takeover ahead of the January 2027 deadline. Creeping equity accumulation through public stock exchanges creates a false sense of security. When an anchor shareholder holds 21% of a public company, nearly 79% of the voting equity remains floating across global institutional registries, Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), and key block holders. I would never fight an anchor shareholder by chasing open-market price spikes on the exchange floor. Bidding up shares in the open market merely inflates the target’s valuation and burns acquiring capital unnecessarily. Instead, I bypass the exchange altogether. The institutional free float of 78.93% comprises local Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), strategic block holders such as the Petrolin Group, and foreign institutional funds in the UK and EU. Through a confidential SPV, off-market swaps and OTC block buys would bring these holdings together into a binding 26%, 31% voting block, giving the syndicate total veto power over special resolutions under CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules. I would assemble a confidential Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), backed by European private equity consortia, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and regional banking syndicates, to execute off-market, over-the-counter (OTC) derivative swaps and block purchases. By quietly targeting institutional free-float, local PFAs, and key block holders like the Petrolin Group, my syndicate would aggregate a binding 26% to 31% voting block. Under dual-listing rules (Nigeria’s CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules), holding a 25%+ stake grants total veto power over special resolutions. This single move empowers my syndicate to block capital alterations, debt restructurings, and strategic asset divestments, effectively neutering unilateral board control without ever triggering an open-market panic. While Phase I neutralises public equity markets, Phase II shifts to hard asset economics in the Niger Delta. Seplat’s multi-billion-dollar valuation depends on seamless midstream processing throughput and export evacuation routes. Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

In dual-listed equity markets, executive succession and boardroom authority are dictated strictly by equity stake, board votes, regulatory approvals, and shareholder consensus. Taking over as chairman or controlling shareholder in a dual-listed energy titan is never a matter of sentiment; it is purely a function of capital deployment, proxy mechanics, and securing the majority vote of the shareholding base. If I were tasked with staging a counter-interdiction against an incumbent anchor investor, I would not engage in a public bidding war. I would deploy a high-conviction, four-phase corporate manoeuvre designed to bypass open markets, choke operational pipelines, and force an asymmetric boardroom takeover ahead of the January 2027 deadline. Creeping equity accumulation through public stock exchanges creates a false sense of security. When an anchor shareholder holds 21% of a public company, nearly 79% of the voting equity remains floating across global institutional registries, Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), and key block holders. I would never fight an anchor shareholder by chasing open-market price spikes on the exchange floor. Bidding up shares in the open market merely inflates the target’s valuation and burns acquiring capital unnecessarily. Instead, I bypass the exchange altogether. The institutional free float of 78.93% comprises local Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), strategic block holders such as the Petrolin Group, and foreign institutional funds in the UK and EU. Through a confidential SPV, off-market swaps and OTC block buys would bring these holdings together into a binding 26%, 31% voting block, giving the syndicate total veto power over special resolutions under CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules. I would assemble a confidential Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), backed by European private equity consortia, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and regional banking syndicates, to execute off-market, over-the-counter (OTC) derivative swaps and block purchases. By quietly targeting institutional free-float, local PFAs, and key block holders like the Petrolin Group, my syndicate would aggregate a binding 26% to 31% voting block. Under dual-listing rules (Nigeria’s CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules), holding a 25%+ stake grants total veto power over special resolutions. This single move empowers my syndicate to block capital alterations, debt restructurings, and strategic asset divestments, effectively neutering unilateral board control without ever triggering an open-market panic. While Phase I neutralises public equity markets, Phase II shifts to hard asset economics in the Niger Delta. Seplat’s multi-billion-dollar valuation depends on seamless midstream processing throughput and export evacuation routes. Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

If I were tasked with staging a counter-interdiction against an incumbent anchor investor, I would not engage in a public bidding war. I would deploy a high-conviction, four-phase corporate manoeuvre designed to bypass open markets, choke operational pipelines, and force an asymmetric boardroom takeover ahead of the January 2027 deadline. Creeping equity accumulation through public stock exchanges creates a false sense of security. When an anchor shareholder holds 21% of a public company, nearly 79% of the voting equity remains floating across global institutional registries, Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), and key block holders. I would never fight an anchor shareholder by chasing open-market price spikes on the exchange floor. Bidding up shares in the open market merely inflates the target’s valuation and burns acquiring capital unnecessarily. Instead, I bypass the exchange altogether. The institutional free float of 78.93% comprises local Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), strategic block holders such as the Petrolin Group, and foreign institutional funds in the UK and EU. Through a confidential SPV, off-market swaps and OTC block buys would bring these holdings together into a binding 26%, 31% voting block, giving the syndicate total veto power over special resolutions under CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules. I would assemble a confidential Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), backed by European private equity consortia, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and regional banking syndicates, to execute off-market, over-the-counter (OTC) derivative swaps and block purchases. By quietly targeting institutional free-float, local PFAs, and key block holders like the Petrolin Group, my syndicate would aggregate a binding 26% to 31% voting block. Under dual-listing rules (Nigeria’s CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules), holding a 25%+ stake grants total veto power over special resolutions. This single move empowers my syndicate to block capital alterations, debt restructurings, and strategic asset divestments, effectively neutering unilateral board control without ever triggering an open-market panic. While Phase I neutralises public equity markets, Phase II shifts to hard asset economics in the Niger Delta. Seplat’s multi-billion-dollar valuation depends on seamless midstream processing throughput and export evacuation routes. Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

Creeping equity accumulation through public stock exchanges creates a false sense of security. When an anchor shareholder holds 21% of a public company, nearly 79% of the voting equity remains floating across global institutional registries, Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), and key block holders. I would never fight an anchor shareholder by chasing open-market price spikes on the exchange floor. Bidding up shares in the open market merely inflates the target’s valuation and burns acquiring capital unnecessarily. Instead, I bypass the exchange altogether. The institutional free float of 78.93% comprises local Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), strategic block holders such as the Petrolin Group, and foreign institutional funds in the UK and EU. Through a confidential SPV, off-market swaps and OTC block buys would bring these holdings together into a binding 26%, 31% voting block, giving the syndicate total veto power over special resolutions under CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules. I would assemble a confidential Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), backed by European private equity consortia, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and regional banking syndicates, to execute off-market, over-the-counter (OTC) derivative swaps and block purchases. By quietly targeting institutional free-float, local PFAs, and key block holders like the Petrolin Group, my syndicate would aggregate a binding 26% to 31% voting block. Under dual-listing rules (Nigeria’s CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules), holding a 25%+ stake grants total veto power over special resolutions. This single move empowers my syndicate to block capital alterations, debt restructurings, and strategic asset divestments, effectively neutering unilateral board control without ever triggering an open-market panic. While Phase I neutralises public equity markets, Phase II shifts to hard asset economics in the Niger Delta. Seplat’s multi-billion-dollar valuation depends on seamless midstream processing throughput and export evacuation routes. Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

I would never fight an anchor shareholder by chasing open-market price spikes on the exchange floor. Bidding up shares in the open market merely inflates the target’s valuation and burns acquiring capital unnecessarily. Instead, I bypass the exchange altogether. The institutional free float of 78.93% comprises local Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), strategic block holders such as the Petrolin Group, and foreign institutional funds in the UK and EU. Through a confidential SPV, off-market swaps and OTC block buys would bring these holdings together into a binding 26%, 31% voting block, giving the syndicate total veto power over special resolutions under CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules. I would assemble a confidential Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), backed by European private equity consortia, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and regional banking syndicates, to execute off-market, over-the-counter (OTC) derivative swaps and block purchases. By quietly targeting institutional free-float, local PFAs, and key block holders like the Petrolin Group, my syndicate would aggregate a binding 26% to 31% voting block. Under dual-listing rules (Nigeria’s CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules), holding a 25%+ stake grants total veto power over special resolutions. This single move empowers my syndicate to block capital alterations, debt restructurings, and strategic asset divestments, effectively neutering unilateral board control without ever triggering an open-market panic. While Phase I neutralises public equity markets, Phase II shifts to hard asset economics in the Niger Delta. Seplat’s multi-billion-dollar valuation depends on seamless midstream processing throughput and export evacuation routes. Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

The institutional free float of 78.93% comprises local Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs), strategic block holders such as the Petrolin Group, and foreign institutional funds in the UK and EU. Through a confidential SPV, off-market swaps and OTC block buys would bring these holdings together into a binding 26%, 31% voting block, giving the syndicate total veto power over special resolutions under CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules. I would assemble a confidential Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), backed by European private equity consortia, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and regional banking syndicates, to execute off-market, over-the-counter (OTC) derivative swaps and block purchases. By quietly targeting institutional free-float, local PFAs, and key block holders like the Petrolin Group, my syndicate would aggregate a binding 26% to 31% voting block. Under dual-listing rules (Nigeria’s CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules), holding a 25%+ stake grants total veto power over special resolutions. This single move empowers my syndicate to block capital alterations, debt restructurings, and strategic asset divestments, effectively neutering unilateral board control without ever triggering an open-market panic. While Phase I neutralises public equity markets, Phase II shifts to hard asset economics in the Niger Delta. Seplat’s multi-billion-dollar valuation depends on seamless midstream processing throughput and export evacuation routes. Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

I would assemble a confidential Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), backed by European private equity consortia, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and regional banking syndicates, to execute off-market, over-the-counter (OTC) derivative swaps and block purchases. By quietly targeting institutional free-float, local PFAs, and key block holders like the Petrolin Group, my syndicate would aggregate a binding 26% to 31% voting block. Under dual-listing rules (Nigeria’s CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules), holding a 25%+ stake grants total veto power over special resolutions. This single move empowers my syndicate to block capital alterations, debt restructurings, and strategic asset divestments, effectively neutering unilateral board control without ever triggering an open-market panic. While Phase I neutralises public equity markets, Phase II shifts to hard asset economics in the Niger Delta. Seplat’s multi-billion-dollar valuation depends on seamless midstream processing throughput and export evacuation routes. Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

By quietly targeting institutional free-float, local PFAs, and key block holders like the Petrolin Group, my syndicate would aggregate a binding 26% to 31% voting block. Under dual-listing rules (Nigeria’s CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules), holding a 25%+ stake grants total veto power over special resolutions. This single move empowers my syndicate to block capital alterations, debt restructurings, and strategic asset divestments, effectively neutering unilateral board control without ever triggering an open-market panic. While Phase I neutralises public equity markets, Phase II shifts to hard asset economics in the Niger Delta. Seplat’s multi-billion-dollar valuation depends on seamless midstream processing throughput and export evacuation routes. Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

Under dual-listing rules (Nigeria’s CAMA 2020 and the UK Listing Rules), holding a 25%+ stake grants total veto power over special resolutions. This single move empowers my syndicate to block capital alterations, debt restructurings, and strategic asset divestments, effectively neutering unilateral board control without ever triggering an open-market panic. While Phase I neutralises public equity markets, Phase II shifts to hard asset economics in the Niger Delta. Seplat’s multi-billion-dollar valuation depends on seamless midstream processing throughput and export evacuation routes. Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

While Phase I neutralises public equity markets, Phase II shifts to hard asset economics in the Niger Delta. Seplat’s multi-billion-dollar valuation depends on seamless midstream processing throughput and export evacuation routes. Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

Production moves from upstream extraction concessions through midstream processing to export pipelines and terminals. Strategic control of midstream processing would allow the syndicate to force tariffs or equity swaps. Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

Instead of confining the battlefield to paper shares, I would direct capital toward acquiring controlling equity or operator status in the critical upstream and midstream infrastructure surrounding Seplat’s core concessions. This includes strategic gas processing terminals, export manifolds, and primary pipeline trunklines. By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

By capturing the processing and transport corridors through which their production must flow, I create decisive operational leverage. Controlling these critical bottlenecks forces the target entity into high-tariff processing agreements or asset-for-equity recapitalisations. In institutional M&A terms, this forces the target entity to trade boardroom seats for operational survival. Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

Under both the UK Companies Act 2006 and Nigerian corporate law (CAMA 2020), shareholders holding at least 10% of issued share capital possess the statutory authority to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

Once my SPV secures its dominant voting bloc, I would trigger an EGM prior to Q4 2026. The requisition agenda would table two non-negotiable statutory resolutions: 1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

1. Enforce Strict Independent Governance: Introduce motions mandating that the Board Chairman position be held exclusively by an independent non-executive director without underlying commercial debt exposure to the firm. 2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

2. Reconstitute Board Leadership: Table a shareholder resolution removing existing succession timelines and nominating an alternative executive slate, headed by my syndicate’s leadership, directly to the board table. When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

When a proxy coalition commanding 35% to 40% of voting shares presents an alternative growth thesis backed by immediate liquidity, institutional PFAs and international asset managers vote for yield and governance, not sentiment. The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

The ultimate manoeuvre is a debt-backed, leveraged tender offer targeting 51% controlling equity of Seplat Energy at a steep control premium over market value. Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

Global mezzanine debt and infrastructure funds would finance a 51% unsolicited leveraged tender offer. If the incumbent matches the offer, it would require billions in cash reserves. If the incumbent accepts, board control would shift to the acquiring syndicate. Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

Supported by global mezzanine debt providers and infrastructure funds, my SPV launches an unsolicited takeover bid. Under takeover codes governing dual-listed entities, an acquisition crossing statutory thresholds forces a mandatory offer to all remaining shareholders. This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

This presents the incumbent anchor investor with a stark binary choice: ● Option A: Deploy billions of dollars in liquid cash to match my tender offer in an escalating bidding war. ● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

● Option B: Accept a buyout or dilution scenario where operational and board leadership transfers to my acquiring syndicate. To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

To dismantle an anchor position in a $2.5 billion dual-listed entity, I organise capital deployment and regulatory alignment across four operational pillars: Capital mobilisation would require approximately 1.5B, 2B+ in liquidity, assembled through a global private equity, sovereign wealth and debt syndicate to outbid the market float. Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

Shareholder voting would require a voting proxy exceeding 21.07%, secured by locking up institutional block shares held by PFAs and foreign funds through OTC proxy agreements. Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

Board governance would require a reconstitution motion, with an EGM requisitioned post-acquisition to vote in new leadership prior to or following January 2027. Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

Regulatory clearances would require NUPRC and ministerial consent. The syndicate would present a superior operational thesis to the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC), demonstrating technical alignment with national gas expansion plans. While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

While market commentators view the January 2027 transition as settled, capital structure and proxy mechanics always dictate authority in global M&A. In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

In public equity markets, leadership isn’t granted by press releases or early corporate announcements. It is acquired through systematic equity aggregation, infrastructure dominance, and proxy mechanics. Whoever commands the structural leverage ultimately controls the boardroom table on January 1, 2027. About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

About author: Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share

Kunle Ilori-Diamond is an international corporate financier and investment management strategist specialising in cross-border M&A, capital structure optimisation, and institutional proxy strategy. www.kunleiloridiamond.com 0805 188 0242 Related News GTBank only Nigerian firm among Forbes’ top 10 African employers Ten youngest U.S. billionaires on the Forbes 400 Fidson wins Roche-backed licence to make generic influenza drug for 129 countries Share